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
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Abstrat
The paper introdues a model for online parallel mahine sheduling, where any single ma-
hine is run on the basis of a loally optimal sequening poliy. Jobs hoose the mahine on
whih they want to be proessed themselves, and in addition, any job j owns a piee of pri-
vate information, namely its indierene ost w
j
for waiting one additional unit of time before
being proessed. We study this setting from the perspetive of algorithmi mehanism design,
and assuming that eah job prefers to be ompleted as early as possible, the utilitarian soial
hoie funtion minimizes the total weighted ompletion times
P
w
j

j
. We prove that in this
setting there exists an online mehanism, running in polynomial time, where rational jobs selet
their mahine in suh a way that the resulting shedule is 3.281-ompetitive with respet to
the o-line optimal solution that maximizes soial welfare. The mehanism deploys an online
payment sheme that indues rational jobs to truthfully report their indierene osts, in the
sense that it is a myopi best response. Moreover, the payment sheme results in a balaned
budget, that is, payments are only made between jobs. We also disuss extensions to meh-
anisms where truth-telling is even an ex-post weakly dominant strategy, while preserving the
ompetitive ratio.
1 Introdution
We study the online version of the lassial parallel mahine sheduling problem to minimize the
total weighted ompletion time {P j r
j
j
P
w
j

j
in the notation of Graham et al. [6℄{ from a new
perspetive: We assume that the system needs to be organized without (too muh of) entral
oordination. More preisely, we ask for the performane of the system if eah of the parallel
mahines is run on the basis of a reasonable (yet suboptimal) sequening poliy loally, while the
online arriving jobs have to deide for the mahines themselves. Eah arriving job would like to be
sheduled as early as possible, and it omes with a piee of information that is not publily known,
namely its indierene ost w
j
for waiting one unit of time. The proessing times p
j
of jobs are
assumed to be publily known. The indierene osts w
j
, together with the proessing times p
j
of
the jobs, however, dene the input for the loal sheduling poliies of the mahines. An arriving
job may thus have an inentive to lie about its true indierene ost, in order to strategially
manipulate the shedule. The goal is to nevertheless set up a system that yields a reasonable
overall performane. In this setting, it is typially desirable to implement a soial hoie funtion
that is utilitarian, i.e., it maximizes the sum of the valuations of all the jobs [17℄. Hene, sine any
job prefers to be ompleted as early as possible, with indierene ost w
j
for waiting, a mehanism

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that minimizes the total weighted ompletion time
P
w
j

j
implements the utilitarian soial hoie
funtion, or in other words, it maximizes the total soial welfare.
From a pure algorithmi perspetive, this problem poses two hallenges, as stated also by
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [11℄. The rst is the lak of information aused by the fat that
jobs beome known to the system only at the moment of their arrival (online algorithms). The
seond is the lak of unbounded omputational resoures, whih allows only for approximate solutions
to the underlying NP-hard optimization problem (approximation algorithms). A third obstrution,
in fat the starting point for what is known as mehanism design, is the asymmetry of information:
information that is required to run the system is private to the partiipants in the system. Selsh
agents trying to maximize their own benet an therefore do so by reporting strategially about
their private information, thus manipulating the resulting outome.
Contribution. The paper touhes on three researh areas, namely the design of approximation
algorithms for NP-hard optimization problems, ompetitive analysis for online optimization, and
mehanism design for resolving the asymmetry of information. Motivated by the observation that
many real-life systems are not entrally but rather hierarhial organized, we assume that any
of the parallel mahines adopts a `reasonable' sheduling poliy loally without further referene
to what is happening on other mahines. More preisely, we assume that any mahine loally
utilizes the well known WSPT rule, sine this is the loally optimal sheduling poliy for the single
mahine sheduling problem 1 j j
P
w
j

j
[20℄. That is, jobs are sheduled in the order of relative
shortest proessing time p
j
=w
j
rst. Intuitively, the omputational omplexity of parallel mahine
sheduling is thus bypassed, of ourse at a possible loss in overall performane. Moreover, we assume
that the WSPT rule is used in a myopi, yet pratially reasonable sense, namely without further
onsideration of the online situation. So at any time, a mahine shedules among all jobs assigned
to it the one with largest ratio w
j
=p
j
rst. Clearly, some proedure is needed to oordinate the
distribution of jobs over mahines. Moreover, given that the knowledge of the private information of
the jobs, their indierene osts w
j
, is vital to ahieve a reasonable overall performane, and given
that any job selshly seeks to minimize its own ompletion time, we need to set up a mehanism that
indues them to hoose the `right' mahine, and to report their private information w
j
truthfully
to the respetive mahine.
We prove in this paper that suh a mehanism exists. More preisely, we present a polynomial-
time mehanism for the previously desribed model for deentralized online sheduling. As usual in
mehanism design, our mehanism denes payments that have to be made by the jobs, depending
on the mahine they hoose, and depending on the report of their private information w
j
. These
payments are used for two dierent purposes. First, as a means of oordination, induing the jobs
to hoose the `right' mahine, and seond, as a means to stimulate truthful reports of the w
j
's.
Building upon an analysis of Megow et al. [16℄, we show that the so-dened deentralized mehanism
is 3.281-ompetitive, that is, under the assumption of rational behavior of the jobs, the obtained
solution is never more than 3.281 times the optimal o-line solution that uses entral oordination.
Note that the performane bound mathes the one obtained by Megow and Shulz [15℄ for the
online parallel mahine problem to minimize
P
w
j

j
(using entral oordination). Moreover, the
payments result in a balaned budget, that is, no payments are required from or to a entral
oordination authority. In the mehanism, a truthful report of the indierene ost w
j
is a myopi
best response for any job. We also give an example to show that no payments exist that would
make truth-telling an ex-post weakly dominant strategy. In other words, the algorithm annot
be turned into a dominant strategy inentive ompatible mehanism. However, we show that
dominant strategy inentive ompatible mehanisms an be obtained, while maintaining the same
performane bound, at the ost of introduing entral oordination for the distribution of the jobs
2
over mahines.
We see the ontribution of the paper twofold. First, we introdue a natural paradigm for de-
entralization of a parallel mahine system: Eah mahine implements a loally optimal sequening
poliy, while jobs have to hoose the mahines themselves. Moreover, the proessing requirements
p
j
of the jobs are assumed to be publily known, sine they are publily observable one the jobs
are sheduled. Private information is only the indierene ost w
j
of any job, measuring the private
ost for being proessed one unit of time later. Seond, we show that in this deentralized model,
both the lak of entral oordination and the asymmetry of information an be bypassed by the
denition of very simple and natural payments that even result in a balaned budget, at least as-
suming a ertain notion of rational behavior. Most importantly, of ourse, the resulting mehanism
for the online parallel mahine sheduling problem provides a ompetitive ratio of 3.281.
Related Work. Mehanism design in ombination with the design of approximation algo-
rithms for sheduling problems has been studied, e.g., by Nisan and Ronen [18℄ and Arher and
Tardos [2℄. In both papers, not the jobs but the mahines are the selshly behaving parts of the
system, and the private information is the proessing speed of the mahine. Arher and Tardos [2℄
onsider as appliation of their main theorem a problem with related parallel mahines, that is,
eah mahine i has a proessing speed s
i
, and a job j requires proessing for p
j
=s
i
time if pro-
essed on mahine i. They dene a neessary and suÆient ondition for the existene of truthful
(dominant strategy inentive ompatible) mehanisms, namely the monotoniity of the total work
assigned to a mahine in dependene on its reported speed s
i
. On the basis of this harateri-
zation, they design a randomized mehanism that yields a deterministi 3-approximation for the
minimum makespan problem, Q j jC
max
, while truthfully reporting s
i
is a dominant strategy that
maximizes the expeted utility of eah mahine. A deterministi monotone algorithm with the
same performane bound was reently proposed by Kovas [12℄. Nisan and Ronen [18℄ onsider
the minimum makespan problem on unrelated mahines, R j jC
max
. There, the proessing time of
any job j on any mahine i is p
ij
, with no relation to speeds of the mahines. In their paper, the
private information of any mahine i is multi-dimensional, namely the vetor of proessing times
(p
i1
; : : : ; p
in
). They present a truthful (dominant strategy inentive ompatible) m-approximation,
where m denotes the number of mahines. Furthermore, they prove that no truthful mehanism
an yield a %-approximation for the minimum makespan problem with % < 2, and present a ran-
domized mehanism that beats this deterministi lower bound. Deentralized sheduling is also
subjet of a paper by Wellman et al. [22℄. In ontrast to the model we propose, however, the term
`deentralized' in [22℄ desribes the fat that agents hoose their bidding strategy on the basis of
loal information, whih diers from our notion of deentralization.
In the sequel of the paper, we formalize the model and introdue the required notation in
Setion2. In Setion3 we rst give a simple example to show that deentralization may be arbitrarily
bad in general, and propose an algorithm for online sheduling on parallel mahines using entral
oordination, inspired by [16℄. In Setion 4, we analyze this algorithm from a mehanism design
perspetive, and in Setion 5 we introdue a simple payment sheme that yields a deentralized
implementation of the same algorithm, in suh a way that truthful reporting the indierene osts
w
j
is a myopi best response for any job. We analyze the performane of the resulting mehanism
in Setion 6 and onlude with further extensions and remarks in Setion 7.
2 Model and Notation
We onsider the online sheduling problem with non-trivial release dates on parallel mahines with
the objetive to minimize the weighted sum of ompletion times, P j r
j
j
P
w
j

j
. We are given a
3
set of jobs J = f1; : : : ; ng, with proessing requirements p
j
> 0, j 2 J , and eah job needs to be
proessed on any of the parallel, idential mahines from the set M = f1; : : : ;mg. We onsider
the time-stamp model of online optimization [19℄, that is, the jobs arrive over time, every job j
at its release date r
j
 0. Only at this time, the system learns about the existene of a job, and
the proessing time p
j
is revealed. We assume that any job j prefers a lower ompletion time to a
higher one, where the ompletion time 
j
is the moment in time when job j's proessing is nished.
Eah job owns a piee of private information, namely its indierene ost, or weight, whih we
denote by w

j
. The weight represents the privately known ost to a job for one additional unit
of time spent waiting. We use w

j
for the indierene ost to dierentiate it from the reported
weight, w
j
, whih may be dierent. We dene the valuation of job j with indierene ost w

j
for a
shedule that gives it ompletion time 
j
as  w

j

j
. While jobs behave selshly trying to maximize
their valuations, the soial welfare is maximized whenever the weighted sum of ompletion times
P
j2J
w

j

j
is minimum.
3 The MinInrease Algorithm
Reall our assumption that eah of the m mahines utilizes the WSPT rule loally, and suppose
that eah job tries to minimize its ompletion time with respet to the already present jobs, as it
has no information about future job arrivals. Then the following an happen.
Example 1. Let there be m mahines and m jobs with proessing times 1; 1   "; 1  2"; : : : ; 1 
(m   1)" for onstant " with 0 < " < 1=m, and assume that eah job has unit weights. Let all
jobs arrive at time zero, but in the given order. (One ould enfore this order by slightly hanging
the release dates and adding dummy jobs, whih would not inuene the demonstrated eet, but
ompliate notation.)
Then an optimal shedule assigns exatly one job to every mahine, resulting in
P
w

j

j
< m. If
eah job an selet a mahine itself, an arriving job only nds jobs already sheduled on mahines
with a larger proessing time. By an indutive argument, no inentives exist to report a false
weight, sine any arriving job will be the shortest, and therefore any of the m mahines would
minimize the job's ompletion time. It is therefore possible that all jobs hoose the same mahine
1
.
The weighted sum of ompletion times is then larger than (1 (m 1)")(m(m+1)=2) and therefore
the approximation ratio is bounded from below by
(1  (m  1)")(m(m + 1)=2)
m
=
m+ 1
2
 
(m+ 1)(m  1)
2
";
whih beomes arbitrarily large for large m.
Hene, a deentralized seletion of mahines by the jobs themselves an ause arbitrarily large
deviations from the optimum. On the other hand, using entral oordination one an enfore the
solution to be O(1)-ompetitive, that is, not worse than a onstant times the o-line optimum. We
next propose an algorithm that is inspired by the MinInrease algorithm in [16℄, whih yields a
ompetitive ratio of 3.281. Sine we have to rely on reported weights w
j
, we onsider
P
j2J
w
j

j
instead of
P
j2J
w

j

j
. In order to formulate the algorithm, we rst introdue the neessary notation.
Let 
j
(i) denote the ompletion time of job j when assigned to mahine i. Let j ! i denote the
fat that job j is sheduled on mahine i. Without loss of generality, we assume that the jobs are
1
Again, one ould make the rst mahine the only one maximizing the utility of an arriving job by adding dummy
jobs with small proessing times that oupy all other mahines, before any `real' job arrives.
4
numbered in order of their arrival, i.e. j < k ) r
j
 r
k
. For any job j, let H(j) denote the set of
jobs that have higher priority than j aording to WSPT, i.e.,
H(j) =

k 2 J j
w
k
p
k
>
w
j
p
j

[

k  j j
w
k
p
k
=
w
j
p
j

:
Note that H(j) inludes j, too. Similarly, let L(j) = J n H(j) denote the set of jobs with lower
priority. In ase of equal ratios w
j
=p
j
, we break ties by giving higher priority to jobs that arrive
earlier aording to the online sequene. Furthermore, let s
j
denote the starting time of j, i.e.,
the time when j eventually starts being proessed. Clearly, s
j
 r
j
. At a given point t in time,
mahine i might be busy proessing a job. Let b
i
(t) denote the remaining proessing time of that
job at time t, i.e., at time t mahine i will be bloked during b
i
(t) units of time for new jobs. If
mahine i is idle at time t, set b
i
(t) = 0. The algorithm onsists of a loal sheduling poliy, the
WSPT rule, that is applied by every mahine and an assignment proedure that is used whenever
a new job arrives.
Algorithm 1: MinInrease Algorithm
Loal Sequening Poliy: Whenever a mahine beomes idle, it starts proessing the job with
highest priority among all available jobs assigned to it. Priority here means the ratio of reported
weight over proessing time. In ase of equal ratios a job with smaller index has higher priority.
Assignment:
1. At time r
j
job j arrives and reports a weight w
j
(possibly w
j
6= w

j
).
2. For every mahine i 2M the inrease in the objetive value (where the true weights w

j
are replaed by the reports w
j
) is omputed. The inrease of j on mahine i is
inr(j; i) = w
j

j
(i) + p
j
X
k2L(j)
k!i
k<j
s
k
>r
j
w
k
= w
j
[r
j
+ b
i
(r
j
) +
X
k2H(j)
k!i
k<j
s
k
>r
j
p
k
+ p
j
℄ + p
j
X
k2L(j)
k!i
k<j
s
k
>r
j
w
k
:
3. Job j is assigned to mahine i
j
2 argmin
i2M
inr(j; i) with minimum index.
The MinInrease Algorithm still makes use of entral oordination in Step 3. In the sequel
we will rst analyze the MinInrease Algorithm, and then introdue payments that allow a
deentralized implementation of the algorithm.
4 The Mehanism Design Perspetive
In order to get hands on the quality of a shedule, our aim is to motivate the jobs to report their
private piee of information, their indierene osts w

j
, truthfully. Therefore we give a denition of
truthfulness whih requires some mehanism design notation rst. In mehanism design, one refers
to the private information of an agent as its type. Let us regard the job set J = f1; : : : ; ng as a of
agents, eah having a true type w

j
from the spae of possible types W . Given a vetor of reports
w = (w
1
; : : : ; w
n
) of all agents (jobs), an alloation algorithm A : W
n
! O omputes an outome
A(w) from the set of possible outomes O. Here, the set of outomes O is the set of all possible
shedules. A payment rule  : W
n
! R
n
determines payments 
1
(w); : : : ; 
n
(w) for every agent.
The tuple  = (A; ) is alled a mehanism. We onne ourselves to diret revelation mehanisms,
where the strategy of eah agent j is simply to report a type w
j
2 W . We assume that agents
5
have quasi-linear utilities, i.e., an agent j 's utility is omputed from its valuation v
j
(A(w)jw

j
) (i.e.,
its valuation v
j
for the outome A(w), given its true type w

j
) and its payment 
j
(w) as follows:
u
j
((w)jw

j
) = v
j
(A(w)jw

j
)  
j
(w).
The valuation of a job j for a shedule that gives it ompletion time 
j
is  w

j

j
. The orre-
sponding utility if j has to pay 
j
will be abbreviated by u
j
and is therefore u
j
=  w

j

j
  
j
: We
will deal with non-negative payments 
j
 0 only, i.e., jobs have to pay a non-negative amount for
being proessed. With this notation, u
j
is always negative. Therefore, we assume that a job has
a onstant and suÆiently large utility for `being proessed at all'. That would add a onstant to
u
j
suh that the true utility is always positive. Sine this does not hange the jobs' behavior when
maximizing their utility, we will omit the onstant and ontinue working with u
j
.
Denition 2. A diret revelation mehanism  is alled truthful or dominant strategy inentive
ompatible if for all agents j 2 J , all xed reports of the other agents w
 j
= (w
1
; : : : ; w
j 1
; w
j+1
; : : : ;
w
n
) and all possible reports w
j
2W , u
j
((w
 j
; w

j
)jw

j
)  u
j
((w
 j
; w
j
)jw

j
). That is, if reporting
the truth is a weakly dominant strategy for eah agent.
An alloation algorithm that omputes outomes that would be desirable for a soial planner is
alled soial hoie funtion. The overall goal is to design a mehanism that implements this soial
hoie funtion. In the model we onsider, we assume a utilitarian soial hoie funtion. This is
one of the ommon goals when maximizing the soial welfare [17℄.
Denition 3. A soial hoie funtion f is alled utilitarian if it maximizes the sum of valuations
of all agents, i.e., f(w) 2 argmax
o2O
P
j2J
v
j
(ojw
j
):
The soial hoie funtion is thus an algorithm maximizing
P
j2J
 w

j

j
, or equivalently mini-
mizing
P
j2J
w

j

j
. Our goal is thus the design of a mehanism that implements this soial hoie
funtion, i.e., a mehanism that yields a shedule minimizing
P
j2J
w

j

j
. For utilitarian soial
hoie funtions we have the following well known theorem.
Theorem 4. (Groves [7℄) If the alloation algorithm A omputes the utilitarian soial hoie fun-
tion for every input vetor w, then there is a payment sheme  suh that the diret revelation
mehanism (A; ) is truthful.
In other words, an algorithm that omputes an optimal shedule for
P
w
j

j
for any vetor
of weights w, an be extended to a truthful mehanism with appropriate payments. Sheduling
to minimize the weighted sum of ompletion times with release dates, however, is NP-hard, even
in the o-line ase [14℄. Furthermore, no online algorithm for the single mahine problem an be
better than 2-ompetitive [9℄ regardless of the question whether or not P=NP, and lower bounds
exist for parallel mahines, too [21℄. Therefore, the soial hoie funtion annot be omputed due
to lak of both unbounded omputational resoures and information. Moreover, it is known that
Theorem 4 does not generalize to the ase where an approximation of the soial hoie funtion is
used, this was shown by Nisan and Ronen [18℄. And indeed, it is not possible to nd a payment 
that ompletes the MinInrease Algorithm to a truthful mehanism. To illustrate the latter, we
use the following neessary ondition formulated by Lavi et al. [13℄.
Denition 5. (Weak Monotoniity) An alloation algorithm A satises weak monotoniity if for
any agent j 2 J , every xed report vetor of the other agents w
 j
and every pair of possible types
ew
j
and w
j
v
j
(A(w
 j
; ew
j
)j ew
j
)  v
j
(A(w
 j
; ew
j
)jw
j
)  v
j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
)j ew
j
)  v
j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
)jw
j
):
6
Lemma 6. (Lavi, Mu'alem, and Nisan [13℄) Let A be an alloation algorithm. If there is a payment
sheme  suh that (A; ) is a truthful mehanism, then A satises weak monotoniity.
This result is now applied to our model. Lemma7 reformulates weak monotoniity in terms of
our valuation funtions.
Lemma 7. For a job j 2 J and xed reports w
 j
by the other jobs, let A(w
 j
; w
j
) denote the
resulting shedule if j reports w
j
. Let 
j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
)) be the orresponding (ex-post ) ompletion
time of j in that shedule. Then A satises weak monotoniity in the desribed model if and only
if it satises
w
j
< ew
j
) 
j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
))  
j
(A(w
 j
; ew
j
))
8 j 2 J; 8w
 j
2W
n 1
; 8w
j
; ew
j
2W:
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above ondition is in fat equivalent to the notion of dereasing work urves as formulated
by Arher and Tardos [2℄. An example in Appendix B shows that the MinInrease Algorithm
does not satisfy weak monotoniity, and therefore does not allow a payment sheme that extends
the algorithm to a mehanism that makes truth-telling an ex-post weakly dominant strategy (i.e.,
a truthful mehanism). Let us summarize this.
Theorem 8. There does not exist a payment sheme that extends the MinInrease algorithm to
a truthful mehanism.
Proof. Use Lemma 7 and the example in Appendix B.
5 Payments for Myopi Rational Jobs
We annot extend theMinInrease algorithm with a payment sheme that makes truth-telling an
ex-post dominant strategy. Therefore, we fous on the moment when a job arrives and is assigned to
a mahine, and propose a payment sheme that makes truth-telling at least a myopi best response
for any arriving job. That is, at time t when a job announes its reported weight w
j
, truth-telling
is a strategy that maximizes the job's utility on the basis of the available information at time t.
The payments we introdue are motivated by the Vikrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mehanism
[7℄. That is, a job j pays at the moment of its plaement on one of the mahines an amount that
ompensates the derease in utility of the other jobs. Besides making the mehanism truthful (in a
myopi sense that is weaker than dominant strategy inentive ompatible!), these payments give us
the opportunity to deentralize the algorithm. If we let jobs selet a mahine themselves, myopi
rational jobs selet the mahine that the MinInrease Algorithm would have seleted, too. We
will see in the next setion that this an be turned into a onstant-fator approximation of the
o-line optimum, given that the jobs behave rationally. The algorithm inluding the payments is
displayed below as the Deentralized MinInrease Algorithm.
The Deentralized MinInrease Algorithm together with the stated payments results in a
balaned budget for the sheduler. That is, the payments paid and reeived by the jobs sum up to
zero, sine every arriving job immediately makes its payment to the jobs that are displaed by it.
Moreover, although reporting the truth does not neessarily result in an ex-post equilibrium, a
truth-telling job is guaranteed the initial utility it ahieves when being sheduled at arrival. That is,
whenever a job's utility is aeted by an arriving job, the derease in utility aused by an inreasing
ompletion time is immediately ompensated for by a payment.
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Algorithm 2: Deentralized MinInrease Mehanism
Loal Sequening Poliy: Whenever a mahine beomes idle, it starts proessing the job with
highest priority among all available jobs assigned to it. Priority here means the ratio of reported
weight over proessing time. In ase of equal ratios a job with smaller index has higher priority.
Assignment:
1. At time r
j
job j arrives and reports a type w
j
(possibly w
j
6= w

j
).
2. For every mahine i, job j observes the urrent situation and omputes

j
(i) = r
j
+ b
i
(r
j
) +
X
k2H(j)
k!i
k<j
s
k
>r
j
p
k
+ p
j
and 
j
(i) = p
j
X
k2L(j)
k!i
k<j
s
k
>r
j
w
k
:
3. Job j hooses a mahine i
j
2M . Its utility for being sheduled on mahine i is
u
j
(i) =  w

j

j
(i)  
i
(j).
4. The job is sheduled on i
j
aording to WSPT among all urrently available jobs on i
j
whose
proessing has not started yet. The payment 
i
j
(j) has to be paid by j.
5. The ompletion time for every job k 2 L(j); k ! i
j
; k < j; s
k
> r
j
inreases by p
j
due to j 's
presene. As ompensation, k reeives a payment of w
k
p
j
.
Theorem 9. Under the Deentralized MinInrease mehanism, an arriving job maximizes
its urrent utility u
j
by reporting its true weight w

j
. Also ex-post, the job will be left with the same
utility u
j
. Furthermore, any report w
j
6= w

j
may lead to a suboptimal utility.
Proof. We rst regard the single mahine ase, i.e., m = 1. Suppose, at the arrival of job j jobs
k
1
; k
2
; : : : ; k
r
with orresponding proessing times p
1
; p
2
; : : : ; p
r
and reported weights w
1
; w
2
; : : : ; w
r
are queueing to be proessed on the mahine, but none of them has started being proessed yet.
Without loss of generality let w
1
=p
1
 w
2
=p
2
     w
r
=p
r
. By hoosing its weight appropriately,
job j ould be sheduled at any position in front of, between or behind the already present jobs.
Therefore, it has to deide for every job k
s
, s 2 f1; : : : ; rg, whether it wants to be plaed in front of
k
s
or not. Displaing k
s
would inrease 
j
(1) by w
s
p
j
, whereas 
j
(1) is dereased by p
s
. Thus, j 's
utility hanges by w

j
p
s
 w
s
p
j
if j displaes k
s
. Therefore, it is rational for j to displae k
s
if and
only if w

j
p
s
 w
s
p
j
> 0; whih is equivalent to w

j
=p
j
> w
s
=p
s
. As the mahine shedules aording
to WSPT, j is plaed at the position that maximizes its utility when reporting w

j
. Therefore,
truth-telling is a dominant strategy in the myopi sense. Note that j an ahieve the position
between job k
s 1
and k
s
by reporting any w
j
2 (p
j
w
s
=p
s
; p
j
w
s 1
=p
s 1
℄. Thus, reporting w

j
is not
the only myopi best response.
For m > 1, reall that j an selet a mahine itself. As reporting the truth maximizes its utility
on every single mahine, and as j an then hoose the mahine that maximizes its utility among
all mahines, truth-telling will maximize j 's immediate utility at arrival.
For the seond part of the laim, suppose k is displaed by the arriving job j. The urrent
ompletion time of k thus inreases by p
j
. Therefore, k's utility dereases by w

k
p
j
. If k has
reported truthfully it reeives a payment of w

k
p
j
in Step 5 of the algorithm, upon j's arrival.
Hene, job k immediately reeives a payment from job j that exatly ompensates for the delay.
For the last laim, suppose j reports w
j
> w

j
. Then it may happen that some job k is assigned
to the same mahine, and w
j
=p
j
> w
k
=p
k
> w

j
=p
j
. With report w
j
, job j would be sheduled in
front of k, whereas w

j
would give it the plae behind k. The inrease in j 's utility when reporting
8
wj
over its utility for reporting w

j
is therefore w

j
p
k
  w
k
p
j
< 0. An analogous argument shows
that reporting less than w

j
an be non-optimal, too.
6 Performane of the mehanism
It is not a goal in itself to have a truthful mehanism, but to use the truthfulness in order to ahieve
a reasonable overall performane in terms of the soial welfare
P
w

j

j
. The Deentralized
MinInrease Algorithm as stated above, however, does not yet yield a onstant approximation
fator; simple examples an be onstruted in the same avor as in [15℄. In fat, it an be onsidered
folklore that early arriving jobs with large proessing times are ritial and have to be delayed
[1, 15, 16℄. In order to ahieve a onstant ompetitive ratio, we also adopt this idea and use
modied release dates as [15, 16℄. To this end, we hange the release date of every job j 2 J from
r
j
to r
0
j
= maxfr
j
; p
j
g, where  is a onstant that will later be hosen appropriately. That is, a
job is onsidered ritial if the job's original release date r
j
is smaller than  times its proessing
time p
j
. A ritial job will be ignored until time p
j
> r
j
. Only then it has to selet a mahine and
report a weight w
j
. Note that the aforementioned properties onerning the balaned budget and
the onservation of utility still apply to the algorithm with modied release dates. Aording to
Theorem9, rational jobs report their weights truthfully. The theorem still applies to the ase with
modied release dates, as the arguments in the proof of Theorem 9 do not depend on the atual
time when the job has to deide (and report a w
j
). Yet, it has to be noted that the modiation
of release dates restrits the level of deentralization in the resulting mehanism, as some entral
ontrol has to assure that a ritial job annot advane to a mahine between its true and its
modied release date. We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Suppose every job is rational in reporting a weight w
j
and seleting a mahine.
Then the Deentralized MinInrease algorithm, together with the modied release dates r
0
j
=
maxfr
j
; p
j
g for ritial jobs, is %-ompetitive, with % = 3:281.
Proof. First, aording to Theorem 9, we an assume that jobs report their weights w

j
truthfully,
and moreover, selet a mahine that minimizes their utility. That is, they selet a mahine i that
minimizes
u
j
(i) = w

j

j
(i) + 
i
(j) = w

j

r
0
j
+ b
i
(r
j
) +
X
k2H(j)
k!i
k<j
s
k
>r
0
j
p
k
+ p
j

+ p
j
X
k2L(j)
k!i
k<j
s
k
>r
0
j
w

k
:
This, however, exatly equals the immediate inrease of the objetive value
P
w

j

j
that is due to
the addition of job j to the shedule. We now laim that we an express the objetive value Z of
the resulting shedule as
Z =
X
j2J
u
j
(i
j
) ;
where i
j
is the mahine seleted by job j. Here, it is important to note that u
j
(i
j
) does not express
the total (ex-post) ontribution of job j to
P
w

j

j
, but only the inrease upon arrival of j on
mahine i
j
. However, further ontributions of job j to
P
w

j

j
only appear when job j is displaed
by some later arriving job with higher priority, say k. This ontribution by job j to
P
w

j

j
,
however, will be aounted for when adding u
k
(i
k
).
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Next, sine we assume that any job maximizes its utility upon arrival, or equivalently minimizes
u
j
(i) when seleting a mahine i, we an apply an averaging argument over the number of mahines,
like in [16℄, to obtain:
Z 
X
i2J
1
m
m
X
i=1
u
j
(i) :
The remainder of the proof utilizes the denitions of u
j
(i) and partiulary the fat that, upon
arrival of job j on any of the mahines i (at time r
0
j
), mahine i is bloked for time b
i
(r
0
j
), whih is
upper bounded by r
0
j
=. This upper bound is mahine-independent, and follows from the denition
of r
0
j
, sine any job k in proess at time r
0
j
fullls p
k
 r
0
k
 r
0
j
. Furthermore, the proof utilizes a
lower bound on any (o-line) optimum shedule from Eastman et al. [5, Thm. 1℄. The details are
moved to Appendix C, due to spae limitations. The resulting performane bound 3.281 is idential
to the one of [15℄, letting  equal (
p
17m
2
  2m+ 1 m+ 1)=(4m).
7 Disussion and Extensions
In the proposed model for deentralized online sheduling, our assumption was that any job ex-
perienes osts w

j
for waiting one extra unit of time, known only to the job itself. Moreover, we
demand a ertain level of deentralization by letting the arriving jobs hoose their mahines them-
selves. The soial welfare is maximal when the total weighted ompletion time
P
w
j

j
is minimal.
There are three drawbaks of the proposed mehanism that we briey disuss next.
The jobs truthfully report their weights w

j
under the assumption of myopi rational behavior.
A stronger result would be that truth-telling is an ex-post dominant strategy. This an indeed be
ahieved when giving up the requirement that jobs hoose the mahines themselves. For example,
when jobs are distributed over mahines uniformly at random, utilizing a haraterization of Gui et
al. [8℄, we an determine a payment sheme in polynomial time suh that the resulting mehanism
is dominant strategy inentive ompatible, independent of the realization of the random hoies.
The performane bound remains 3.281 (in expetation). However, when giving up on the deentral-
ization, one an as well set up a dominant strategy inentive ompatible mehanism that is based
upon a reently proposed algorithm by Correa and Wagner [4℄, yielding a (deterministi) ompet-
itive ratio of 2.62. But notie that, in both ases, the resulting payments an only be determined
ex-post, and annot be implemented online, like with the mehanism we propose.
As a tribute to the desired onstant ompetitive ratio, we had to take speial are of ritial jobs
(i.e., jobs with p
j
> r
j
), delaying their moment of deision from r
j
to r
0
j
=  p
j
. Clearly, as stated
already above, this restrits the level of deentralization, as some entral ontrol has to implement
this delay of ritial jobs. However, given the restrition that jobs hoose mahines themselves, we
are not aware of a better way to handle ritial jobs.
We argued that the soial welfare is maximized whenever the total weighted ompletion time
of jobs
P
w
j

j
is minimal. Given that we have to onne ourselves with approximations, it would
be more desirable, though, to minimize the total weighted ow time,
P
w
j
(
j
  r
j
). However, note
that for a single mahine and unit weights, this problem does not even admit a onstant-fator
approximation algorithm in the o-line setting [10℄, unless P=NP. Nevertheless, it would be an
interesting diretion for future researh to onsider also other metris than
P
w
j

j
, e.g. streth
metris as proposed in [3℄.
Aknowledgements. Thanks to Dries Vermeulen for some helpful disussions.
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Appendies
A Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7. Let for a job j 2 J and xed reports w
 j
for the other jobs A(w
 j
; w
j
) denote the resulting
shedule if j reports w
j
as omputed by alloation algorithm A. Let 
j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
)) be the orresponding
(ex-post ) ompletion time of j in that shedule. Then A satises weak monotoniity in our desribed model
if and only if it satises
w
j
< ew
j
) 
j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
))  
j
(A(w
 j
; ew
j
))
8 j 2 J ; 8w
 j
2 W
n 1
; 8w
j
; ew
j
2 W:
Proof. Let w
j
< ew
j
. Using the speial struture of the valuation funtion in our model the weak monotoniity
ondition beomes:
v
j
(A(w
 j
; ew
j
)j ew
j
)  v
j
(A(w
 j
; ew
j
)jw
j
)  v
j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
)j ew
j
) + v
j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
)jw
j
)  0
,
  ew
j

j
(A(w
 j
; ew
j
)) + w
j

j
(A(w
 j
; ew
j
)) + ew
j

j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
))  w
j

j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
))  0
,
( ew
j
  w
j
)[
j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
))  
j
(A(w
 j
; ew
j
))℄  0
,

j
(A(w
 j
; w
j
))  
j
(A(w
 j
; ew
j
))  0 ;
where the last equivalene follows from w
j
< ew
j
:
B The MinInrease algorithm is not weakly monotone
Example 11. Let [w=p℄ denote a job with (reported ) weight w and proessing time p. Suppose that we have
to shedule the following four jobs on two mahines: [6=3℄; [5=4℄; j = [w=
1
7
℄; [20=4℄, where w is a parameter.
Let all jobs have release date zero, but let us assume that they nevertheless arrive in the given order. (We
ould alternatively enfore this order by adding small but positive onstants to some of the release dates
without hanging the eet demonstrated below. )
Let us onsider the MinInrease algorithm. The rst job [6/3℄ inreases the objetive value on both
mahines by the same amount and is therefore sheduled on the rst mahine. The seond job [5/4℄ is then
assigned to the seond mahine. We onsider two values for the weight of j, namely w
1
=
1
14
and w
2
=
1
2
. In
the rst ase the weight over proessing time ratio is
1
2
and therefore smaller than the respetive ratios of the
two jobs already assigned to mahines. Thus, j would be sheduled last on eah of the mahines aording
to the WSPT rule. It would ause the following inreases:
inr(j; 1) =
1
7
w
1
+ 3w
1
12
inr(j; 2) =
1
7
w
1
+ 4w
1
:
Therefore, j is assigned to the end of mahine 1, whih results in the preliminary shedule depited on the
left of Figure 1.
The seond ase for w
2
=
1
2
yields a ratio of
7
2
, whih would plae j rst on both mahines. The
respetive inreases are:
inr(j; 1) =
1
7
w
2
+ 6 
1
7
inr(j; 2) =
1
7
w
2
+ 5 
1
7
:
Job j would be sheduled on mahine 2 yielding the shedule depited on the right of Figure 1. The last
PSfrag replaements
11
22
6/36/3
5/45/4
j
j
Figure 1: Shedules for Example 11
job [20/4℄ has a ratio larger than all the ratios of the present jobs. Therefore it would be sheduled rst on
both mahines. In both ases the total weight of jobs on the rst mahine is larger than the total weight of
jobs on the seond mahine. Therefore the inrease in the objetive value aused by the last job is in both
ases smaller on the seond mahine. Thus the job is sheduled on the seond mahine, whih inreases j 's
ompletion time only in the seond ase. Thus, j is ompleted at time 3+
1
7
when reporting
1
14
and at time
4 +
1
7
when reporting
1
2
. Therefore, the MinInrease algorithm does not satisfy weak monotoniity.
C Proof of Theorem 10
Theorem 10. Suppose every job is rational in reporting a weight w
j
and seleting a mahine. Then the
Deentralized MinInrease algorithm, together with the modied release dates r
0
j
= maxfr
j
; p
j
g for
ritial jobs, is %-ompetitive, with % = 3:281.
Proof. Reall that Z denotes the objetive value of the nal shedule produed by the Deentralized
MinInrease algorithm. Let Z
OPT
denote the value of the optimum o-line solution. We have already
argued that
Z 
X
i2J
1
m
m
X
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u
j
(i) :
Next, reall that upon arrival of job j on any of the mahines i (at time r
0
j
), mahine i is bloked for time
b
i
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j
)  r
0
j
=. Therefore we get, for any j,
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:
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The last term an be rewritten as follows:
X
j2J
p
j
X
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m
=
X
(j;k):
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X
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:
Thus,
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j
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1
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j
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:
Now, we apply a lower bound on the optimal o-line shedule from [5, Thm. 1℄, namely
Z
OPT

X
j2J
w

j
X
k2H(j)
p
k
m
+
m  1
2m
X
j2J
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
j
p
j
;
yielding:
Z  Z
OPT
+
X
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
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)r
0
j
+
m  1
2m
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j
p
j
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+
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
(1 +
1
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+ (1 + +
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
;
where in the seond inequality r
j
+ p
j
is used as an upper bound on r
0
j
. Applying the trivial lower bound
P
j2J
w

j
(r
j
+ p
j
)  Z
OPT
, we get:
Z  Z
OPT
+max

1 +
1

; 1 + +
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
Z
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= 2Z
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1

; +
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
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:
Therefore, we get the performane bound
% = 2 +max

1

; +
m  1
2m

:
This an now be optimized for , whih was already done in [15℄. There it was shown that % < 3:281 for
 =
p
17m
2
  2m+ 1 m+ 1)=(4m).
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